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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 302 
Accident time: 12:25 Accident Date: 05/10/2000 
Where it occurred: Cordon Sanitaire, 
Mozambique border 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Other Date of main report: 05/10/2000 
ID original source: JM Name of source: Mounser/AVS 
2001:Z09 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: R2M2 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
 
Accident report 
The following official “accident summary” was made available in January 2001. No other 
report was made. The summary was compiled by the demining group’s site manager. For 
obscure reasons, the country manager of the programme edited the content of the following 
before making it available. 
The following text has only been further edited when necessary to conceal the identity of 
individuals and organisations involved. 
1 
1. On 5 October at 12:55, [the victim] was carrying out normal demining duties with 
complete PPE on. He was clearing in the Cordon Sanitaire when a mine suspected to 
R2M2 model detonated on its own 2,5 metres in front of him. At that particular time [the 
victim] was in a kneeling position excavating to try and locate another mine. He received 
no injuries except for an expected complaint that he was not hearing properly. 
2. It was concluded that this was another case of an R2M2 going off on its own. Many such 
cases where the mines go off even quite far away from any cause of interference have 
already been recorded. 
3. The investigation has therefore been closed. 
Signed: Operations Manager 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 382 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not applicable 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 




No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is classed as “Unavoidable” because the victim appears to 
have been working properly and fallen victim to a spontaneous detonation. 
However, it was known by this time that the mechanical preparation on the site left mines 
exposed and in a dangerous condition (see Related Papers) so the secondary cause is listed 
as “Inadequate equipment”. Management revised demolition procedures because of a 
perceived increased risk, but apparently did not reconsider the manner in which the machines 
were deployed. This may be seen as a “Management/control inadequacy”. 
The accident investigation is considered inadequate because it was edited prior to being 
made available.   
 
Related papers 
In an exchange with one of the Field Supervisors at the site, the researcher asked the 
following: 
Q) It seems that several accidents involved spontaneous detonations of R2M2s after 
machines had worked in the area. Is this so? 
2 
A) True the R2M2 had a strange habit of detonating without anything directly appearing to 
cause the mine to function. This did usually occur after a machine had been in the vicinity. 
Remember that we (the mechanical unit) were operating in advance of the manual follow up 
using bush-cutting equipment, bulldozers and the MineBuster excavator. I witnessed mines 
detonating without external influence personally – one went off 35m from my vehicle as I was 
travelling up the safety road.  
This happened only in the R2M2 areas and I suspect that the plastic assembly of the fuse 
housing was damaged (the plastic distorted) and although the metallic balls of the safety 
release had released, the distortion of the plastic prevented the firing spring from creeping 
forward and initiating the mine. When the heat of the day expanded the plastic, the spring was 
released and the pin forced into the stab-detonator. 
The thought of moving R2M2 mines in this condition - putting them into a pit to be destroyed 
(max 10 in a pit) – was unacceptable. So R2M2s found in areas after the machines had 
worked were burned in-situ. Other mines were still destroyed in pits. 
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